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Abstract 
This article summarises the 2010–15 Coalition government’s education policy, contrasting their 
attempts to liberalise education markets with the desire to impose a highly traditional curriculum. 
The government’s quite radical reforms have not been easy to implement, taking place against 
severe budgetary constraints and a minority Coalition partner with ambitions to improve the 
educational outcomes of children from low income families. It could be argued that the reforms 
have been successfully implemented, and there is little prospect of wholesale reversal by any future 
government. However, their combative approach to reform leaves a demotivated teacher 
workforce, a possible impending teacher recruitment crisis as the economy recovers, and a tangled 
web of accountability structures that will need to be resolved. 
Introduction 
The Coalition government’s education policy could be described as an alliance of libertarian and 
traditional values, continuing the themes of the 1979–97 Tory governments. To call it a coalition 
policy might be a stretch; like no other Secretary of State in this government, Michael Gove can lay 
claim to ownership of the direction and drive for change in the department he ran from 2010 to 
2014.1 
As libertarians, the government set out a policy manifesto to empower parents as consumers, with 
the rhetoric of Free Schools built round the idea that any person with the will and the support could 
set up a local school and be funded to do so by the state. The central belief was that market forces, if 
set free, will improve standards through competition amongst schools offering diversity of 
pedagogical approaches and ethos. Resulting educational disruption through entry and exit of 
schools from the market should be hailed as a success rather than a cause for concern.  
However, the radical market idea of devolved power to the unit of the school, driven by parent 
choice, was countered by a rich seam of centralisation resulting from ‘traditional values’, or at least a 
traditional view of curriculum and teaching that had to be driven from the central government 
department. 
These libertarian and traditional approaches were implemented by ministers and their advisors who 
gave the impression that anybody involved in education as it was set – local authorities, teachers 
and educationalists – was either not up to the job or could not be trusted. Not least because the 
values of those people were not aligned with the government’s view of how to create a ‘good’ 
society and economic properity and, left to their own devices, might ignore the call for a classical 
education. Nothing more emphasises this theology than the controversy over the re-writing of the 
history syllabus in 2013 as part of wider National Curriculum reforms (DFE, 2013a). The initial 
proposals for a sequential “narrative of British progress”, in the words of Michael Gove, had the air 
of central direction rather than a trust in devolution. 
The constraints of budgetary pressure and accommodation of Liberal Democrat policy significantly 
shaped this government’s programme in education, as elsewhere. Budgetary pressures in a 
government committed to reducing the deficit left little room for the capital outlay necessary to 
sustain a significant market entry. The Liberal Democrats hailed new interventions for children from 
disadvantaged families, while controversially dropping their pledge not to increase higher education 
tuition fees. 
Focusing market forces on a traditional  schooling agenda  
Proponents of the idea that market forces are the best route to improving the schooling system have 
recognised that there has been, to date, a weak relationship between deregulation, increasing 
school choice and raising attainment (Allen and Burgess, 2010). The government’s programme of 
reforms attempts to remedy this in six ways:  
1. Reforms to school league tables to ensure that parents are better able to identify school 
quality; 
2. Threats to the survival of underperforming schools through a reformed inspection process 
and forced takeover of governance and management; 
3. The introduction of newly created free schools to enhance parental choice and competition; 
4. An increased capacity of schools to control their own operations through academy status; 
5. Incentives for all teachers to raise the attainment of the children they teach through 
mandatory Performance Related Pay schemes; and 
6. Reforms to teacher training to ensure the right mix of candidates enter the profession and 
are trained to suit schools needs. 
Measuring school performance  
Reforming league tables is the most straightforward means by which government can influence 
school curriculum choices, since there is enormous pressure from parents, Ofsted and governing 
bodies to perform  well on these metrics, even where there is little threat of loss of pupils. The initial 
market-orientated stance of the government was that parents were capable of interpreting data to 
suit their own interests, so the logical approach was to publish every statistic possible. This included 
reporting performance statistics separately for children of low, middle and high prior attainment, in 
line with proposals I published with Simon Burgess (Allen and Burgess, 2011, 2013). This was a rather 
overoptimistic assessment of the typical parent’s data-processing skills and so, not surprisingly, the 
key measure of five or more  A*–C at GCSE, including English and maths, continued to dominate 
schools’ focus. 
From 2012 onwards, the traditionalist secondary school curriculum was accelerated through league 
table reforms. The government identified that many children were not being given the opportunity 
to study the widely accepted academic broad curriculum of English, maths, two sciences, a humanity 
subject and a language. They announced that schools would be judged on a binary measure of 
whether a child had achieved at least a grade C in each of these subjects, labelling it the ‘English 
Baccalaureate’ or EBacc. 
This began the process of a radical restructuring of the curriculum within many schools, reducing 
their  dependence on arts and vocational subjects, many  of which dropped out of performance 
table measures  altogether as the list of accepted equivalents was reduced  in line with 
recommendations by Professor Alison Wolf’s review (Wolf, 2011). However, the EBacc indicator gave 
no incentive for schools to reprioritise their curriculum for those students who stood little chance of 
gaining a C in these subjects, so the government went further still and from 2015 onwards a new 
measure called ‘Attainment 8’ (and its associated ‘Progress 8’ that accounts for prior  achievement) 
will give points for every child who scores  more than a grade U in these subjects (or in computer 
science). For a government that takes the starting point  that this curriculum is appropriate for all 
children this is a very attractive accountability measure since it incentivises headteachers to ensure 
that all their major departments are effective for children from the top to the bottom of the ability 
spectrum. 
A final set of reforms is still to be implemented, though there is considerable uncertainty about 
whether this  will take place as planned from 2015. GCSE grades will be changed from 1–9 in order 
to differentiate better  between A and A* grades at the upper end. AS levels will be decoupled from 
the A level and will return to being  a separate, stand-alone qualification. These reforms  appear to 
be ideologically driven, not supported by  schools, and strongly opposed by universities who 
have  been able to use AS level grades to select applicants.  
Primary schools have been subject to considerable change  in accountability measures too. An age 6 
statutory  phonics screening check, which entertainingly includes  fake words, ensures that schools 
are using the approved synthetic phonics approach to teaching children to read.  An extension paper 
was reintroduced for Key Stage two  tests to distinguish between the large group of children  who 
were achieving the highest marks in the main paper  (about 17 per cent of children were scoring the 
top mark  on the government measure of their combined maths,  English and science performance). 
The government  also reintroduced marks for grammar, punctuation and  spelling in primary school 
tests. 
Then, responding to criticisms of the ways that the  progress of children was monitored throughout 
English schools via ‘Levels’, the government decided that Levels  should be abandoned and replaced 
with whatever  system for monitoring the schools themselves thought  best. Levels did indeed have 
their problems, and almost  nobody supported the way they were being used, but  replacing them 
with nothing is likely to create chaos in a system where teachers need a common language to 
talk  about the standards of children. Indeed, where schools  have now devised a new scheme, it is 
usually Levels in all but name. It remains unclear what primary school  assessment will eventually 
look like, with the possibility  of radical reform to both entry (Foundation Stage  Profile) and exit (Key 
Stage two) tests in the near future.   
School inspection  
The government turned itself to school inspection reforms first through the appointment of Sir 
Michael Wilshaw as Chief Inspector of Education, Children’s  Services and Skills on 1 January 2012. 
Sir Michael had a pedigree in state education, as a teacher for more than 40 years and over half of 
that time as a headteacher  in London, most recently of the famous Mossbourne Community 
Academy in Hackney.  
Sir Michael had presided over the amazing turnaround of fortunes of a state school within a 
transformed local authority and city’s education system. So he perhaps understandably had a belief 
that there were ‘no excuses’ for difficulties in any school in the country. He announced changes to 
the inspection regime from September 2012 by declaring that “Satisfactory is no longer 
satisfactory”.  Schools that had previously breathed a sigh of relief as they had passed an inspection 
would now be labelled  ‘requires improvement’ and given clear instructions by  Ofsted about what 
they need to improve. They would have a monitoring regime that paralleled that given to failing 
schools: checking action plans, monitoring  progress and re-inspecting within a shorter period  of 
time. If a school merited the new designation of  ‘requiring improvement’ for the third time 
consecutively,  instead it would be likely to be found inadequate at that  inspection and placed in 
‘special measures’. 
At the other end of the spectrum it became harder to achieve the ‘outstanding’ grade, with 
designation only  possible if the teaching and performance management of  staff in the school was 
judged outstanding. 
The final part of Sir Michael’s new approach was to reduce the notice of inspections, previously up 
to three  weeks’ notice of an inspection for schools and FE colleges and eight weeks for initial 
teacher education providers.  In all cases this was reduced to two working days.  
The package as a whole increased the power of Ofsted over the teaching profession and set the 
course of action for individual school establishments across the country. Of course this gave more 
power to Ofsted, but there is a continuing question mark as to whether Ofsted itself is a capable 
organisation. In giving it wider powers, the grave concerns about consistency and quality of the 
inspectorate, most of whom were employed by external agencies, are ignored.2 At some point there 
has to be a quality assessment of Ofsted itself, given its great reach, power to intervene, and 
potential for such powers widely to outstrip its organisational capacity to maintain a high quality 
inspectorate given the burden of its own work. 
Free schools and academies 
The idea behind the free schools programme was to open new Academies following applications 
from a range of different groups, including parents, teachers and Academy chains. The expectation 
was that this would raise standards by increasing local choice for parents, injecting competition 
between local schools and encouraging innovation. The government moved fast to open 173 free 
schools by September 2013, with another 100 or so opening over the 2013/14 academic year. 
It  should be said at this point that it was no surprise to most commentators when it was found that 
the initial  capital costs of setting up free schools were much higher than expected, at £6.6 million 
per school, which had a detrimental impact on other aspects of the DfE capital budget (National 
Audit Office, 2013). 
Some of the schools have been more controversial than others: a large proportion of the schools are 
based on a religious foundation; some are simply existing state schools that have avoided local 
authority reorganisation by re-opening as free schools; some are existing private schools that have 
decided their future viability is best served as a state-funded school. Some interesting consequences 
of the policy have been to give parents the power to save schools threatened by closure; and to give 
independent schools threatened with bankruptcy the option to be bailed out by the state. 
However, the right measure of the policy is whether it is successful, not whether it is controversial. 
On this, it is too early to say whether the free schools will be either popular or effective. Early 
intakes have been relatively small, but this is often because they are approved too late to take part 
in the Common Application Process to schools. Their intakes are typically the slightly less deprived 
and more able in the neighbourhoods from which they recruit (Green et al., 2015). 
Ofsted  judgements of the few that have been inspected so far have been positive, on average, 
although two have been  judged as ineffective and two have closed as a result.  
Whilst the free schools programme has been the highest profile education policy of this government, 
the process  to encourage or force schools to become academies, independent of local authority 
control, has been far  greater in scale and impact. Initially, the possibility of conversion was 
restricted to schools judged as  outstanding by Ofsted but it was later extended to  all schools who 
could prove capable of doing so. The Department for Education has been accused of bribing  schools 
with one-off payments outside their funding  allocation to convert to academy status (Cusick 
and  Garner, 2013). More importantly, re-occurring financial advantage to many converting came in 
the way in which  the DfE reallocated the money currently retained by  local authorities to support 
their maintained schools  (LACSEG). This is because new academies were given a share of this figure 
on a per pupil basis, even though  local authorities heavily use the cash to support schools  with high 
pupil mobility and levels of disadvantage. The  calculation of the overall local authority budget was 
also  incorrect in a number of cases (Cook, 2013).  
There has been forced conversion of a number of schools to academy status following poor Ofsted 
ratings (Wormald and Lauener, 2012). These schools were given new academy sponsorship, often 
against the will of the parents and teachers in the schools themselves. This can be seen as a minor 
modification of the policies of the preceding Labour government, who used academy sponsorship as 
a way to turn around failing schools, but did so with local authority consent.  
Teacher performance related pay  
The enthusiasm for performance related pay for  complex white collar jobs with ill-defined outputs is 
one of curiosity to many economists, given how rarely it is backed up with evidence that it works 
(see, e.g. Lavy, 2009; Fryer, 2013). However, pay flexibility is appealing to governments who act as 
monopsony wage setters since it holds the possibility of retaining the most talented staff through 
pay incentives without substantially increasing  the pay burden overall.  
Headteachers and governing bodies were not lobbying for new pay reforms. Some may have been 
ideologically opposed to performance related pay, but many more felt that pay flexibility has always 
been quietly possible through the use of existing pay increments and responsibility points. More 
importantly, they are  nervous about implementing such a reform fairly without  reliable measures 
of teacher quality, and of undermining  a team culture and sense of common purpose within  their 
schools.  
Nevertheless, from September 2013 schools were required to revise their pay and appraisal policies 
to  link pay progression to teacher’s performance in their  school. They could do this in order to 
recruit and retain excellent teachers or to target need in certain subjects. It  is still too early to say 
what type of schemes schools will  introduce, let alone what impact they might have, but it  is hard 
to see high-powered, sophisticated performance  related pay schemes being introduced by more 
than a  handful of schools.  
Teacher training  
The government perceived two major problems with teacher training: (1) the quality of the 
applicants to teacher training was not high enough and individuals with poor academic credentials 
were entering the  profession; (2) the training itself did not adequately prepare for the realities of 
teaching in schools. 
Their response to the first problem was to require that new graduates have at least a 2:2 in their 
undergraduate  degree to get state-funded training and to remove maintenance grants for almost all 
(except those with  a good degree training in a shortage subject). This was  not a particularly logical 
response and may in fact lower  the supply of high quality trainees for several reasons.  Firstly, we 
require a fairly fixed and predictable number  of people to train to be teachers each year. Restricting 
eligibility requirements does not increase the number  of applicants with good academic credentials, 
unless  it uncovers a surfeit of labour previously unwilling to  apply because entry was not 
prestigious enough.  
Secondly, we know very little about how to identify  those with potential to be good teachers before 
they  try it out, and we are quite certain that degree class is a poor proxy for potential (Slater et al., 
2012). So the tightening of academic entry requirements into teaching  is not helpful: it will restrict 
the quantity of recruits and  have no impact at all on average teaching effectiveness.  A better policy 
is to recruit a broader pool of trainees  to try out teaching for a short time and to incentivise  teacher 
training institutions to drop trainees from their  programmes as evidence accumulates on their 
suitability for the profession. By contrast, it is still the case that  almost everyone can pass a teacher 
training course because these institutions are judged on completion  rates and progression into the 
profession. 
Thirdly, replacing maintenance grants for trainees with  student loans barely reduces the costs to the 
government  of teacher training. This is because the typical teacher, if he or she remains in the 
profession, may never earn  enough to repay the loans associated with teacher training (depending 
on how the repayment threshold is raised  over time) (Allen et al., 2014). It is nevertheless likely 
to  act as a financial deterrent for some. A more attractive  policy would be to declare the fee and 
maintenance  costs as zero, provided an individual teaches in the state  maintained sector for (say) 
four years, introducing a  repayment plan for those who leave to work in private  schools or in other 
industries. 
It is not yet clear whether the training subsidy reforms  will cause a deterioration in the quality of 
the pool of applicants to teacher training. They were introduced  against the backdrop of high 
graduate unemployment  and so application rates to the profession have held up.  The combination 
of rising pupil rolls creating increased  demand for teachers and the economic recovery  providing 
alternative employment opportunities may  produce a teacher supply crisis in the next few years. 
The government responded to the very real concerns of both schools and former trainees that the 
Post Graduate Certificate in Education left them ill-prepared for the  classroom by declaring that 
they wanted the majority  of the profession to learn the ‘craft’ of teaching directly  from teachers. 
Their new school-based training route called School Direct took its first (very small) intake  in 
September 2012. Participating schools (or groups of schools) took responsibility for designing and 
delivering  a one-year programme leading to Qualified Teacher Status. 
However, in September 2014 the statistics revealed that just 61 per cent of School Direct places 
were filled this  year; 6,451 of the 11,335 fee-paying places allocated  and 2,781 of the 3,919 salaried 
places. This compares  to 90 per cent of university places. Last year 68 per cent  of School Direct 
places were filled (Ward, 2014). These  shortfalls will start to create a very significant teacher  supply 
crisis if they are allowed to accumulate against a  rising need for teachers.  
It would seem that policymakers correctly identified a problem with institution-based training, but 
misjudged  the solution. Schools themselves may feel that newly  qualified teachers are not 
adequately prepared but they lack the capacity to devise and manage teacher training  themselves. 
The government should have anticipated  this: the existing school-led routes (GTP and SCITT)  were 
widely lauded but remained small. The education system finds itself with a free-rider problem where 
every  school would like somebody else’s school-trained teacher. Teach First has developed a small 
but successful school-based training route. However, signing up schools to the programme remains 
the greatest constraint on its growth  and many of their schools in very deprived areas join 
to  overcome recruitment difficulties. Moreover, Teach First  offers considerable support to the 
schools involved in  the programme. 
On the potential trainee side, it is not difficult to imagine why School Direct is struggling to fill places. 
It could  be that trainees feel safer training in an institution that gently exposes them to teaching, or 
perhaps it is unrealistic to ask applicants to choose and apply directly  to schools given they are 
unlikely to know anything  about what type of school might suit them.  
Protecting poorer students from a harsh budgetary climate  
Over the course of this government, education has suffered its largest real-term funding cuts since 
the 1950s (Chowdry and Sibieta, 2011). These cuts have been greatest in higher education, post-16 
education, early years and youth services, and on capital spending. By contrast, schools have been 
relatively well-protected because almost the entire budget is spent on staff and it is unpalatable to 
pass costs onto children and their families. 
Higher education 
Higher education is the sector that has suffered least, and arguably gained, from austerity. The 
higher education finance regime introduced in September 2012 allowed universities to set variable 
tuition fees, which largely offset cuts to government funding. The government chose to increase fees 
from £3,290 to £6,000, with an upper cap on tuition fees at £9,000 per year from 2012.  Most 
universities have decided to charge the full £9,000 and to compete for students on reputation and 
quality,  rather than on price. At these levels, many courses with lower delivery costs in the arts and 
humanities have  become almost entirely funded by student borrowing  rather than the taxpayer. 
However, this new system is still costly for taxpayers because the government’s estimate of the 
portion of loan outlay that will never be  repaid by graduates – known as the resource 
accounting  and budgeting (RAB) charge – has risen steadily from an initial 28 per cent to 45 per 
cent, very close to the level at  which there will have been no savings to the public purse  from the 
trebling of free and the slashing of direct grant  (Morgan, 2014). Alongside these reforms, some 
attempt  at further liberalisation of the market took place, with universities exempt from the old 
rules capping student  numbers for students who achieved high grades (at least  AAB). 
The government has changed the terms under which  students from low income backgrounds are 
supported  through university. The National Scholarship Programme  replaced the minimum 
statutory bursary and universities  can use it to provide financial support in the form of  fee waivers, 
cash bursaries, and subsidised goods and  services. However, because universities have received 
the  funding in relation to their size rather than the socioeconomic make-up of their student body, 
lower-ranked  institutions have seen a fall in the amount of support  they can offer on a per-student 
basis (Chowdry et al., 2012a). 
The interesting aspect of these higher education policy  reforms is that despite all the controversy, 
particularly  over the Liberal Democrat pledge, the new funding regime is actually more progressive 
than its predecessor. The poorest 29 per cent of graduates will be better off under  the new system 
and the richest 15 per cent of graduates  will pay back more than they borrow. This means 
that  prospective students from poorer backgrounds should  not be discouraged by the scheme, 
unless they are debt  averse or do not receive clear information about the  likely costs and benefits 
of going to university (Chowdry, 2012b). 
Post-16 education 
Further education has suffered deep cuts over the course of this government, with predictably little 
publicity or  public disapproval. In 2010 the FE budget was cut by £1.1 billion (25 per cent) and in 
June 2013 another  £230 million of cuts were announced. It has since been announced that the Adult 
Skills Budget (which  funds non-academic education to the over 19s) will be  cut by £460 million by 
2015–16 (Elledge, 2014). The  government implemented unit cost reductions in the 16– 19 
participation budget and removed support provided  by the Education Maintenance Allowance 
(EMA),  a programme of conditional cash transfers that had  increased post-compulsory participation 
rates (Dearden  et al., 2009). 
Critics of EMA had pointed out its large deadweight  loss because most (88 per cent) recipients 
would have chosen to attend a post-16 institution without being paid to do so. However, IFS 
estimates that wage gains  would outstrip payment costs obviously accounted for  this (Chowdry and 
Emmerson, 2010). Participation in  education by 16–18 year olds in England has indeed  fallen for the 
first time since 2001 (DfE, 2013a). 
Early years 
The government has also cut early years funding. There are 581 fewer Children’s Centres under this 
government: 3,019 in 2014; 3,361 in 2010 (Directgov, 2014). Added to this, the government, in 2013, 
made a controversial  announcement that they intended to relax childcare  ratios in early years 
settings. The rationale was that the sector was stuck in a low quality cycle where per child  costs 
were almost prohibitively high to parents, despite  very low sector wages, as a result of worker–child 
ratios.  By introducing more stringent entry requirements to the profession in the form of early years 
qualifications, the  new more highly trained workers would be able to cope  with more children per 
worker and would be able to  receive a higher wage for doing so (DfE, 2013b). The idea of the 
imposition of tougher entry requirements that  are almost certainly unrelated to worker quality 
mirror  those introduced for teacher training and so all the same  criticisms apply here. These 
reforms were said to mirror policy in France, a country not noted by DfE research for  its high quality 
childcare (Pascal et al., 2013). However,  the reforms to the ratios hit a political buffer when 
the  Liberal Democrats, with the credit taken by the Deputy  Prime Minister, intervened to kill off the 
policy.  
The most disadvantaged 2-year-olds can now receive up to fifteen hours a week of fully funded 
childcare (on the same terms as all 3-year-olds do). Just a month after the start of the programme an 
impressive 70 per cent of  eligible children were taking up places, although there are problems with 
supply of high quality places for this  age group (DfE, 2013c). 
Capital spending 
Early cuts by Parliament to capital spending on schools, including the cancellation of the Building 
Schools  for the Future programme, could not have come at a  worse time – with rapidly rising 
demand for school  places in the primary sector. A failure by the Office for National Statistics to 
reflect a rising birth rate since 2001 in its population projection until 2008 meant that the 
Department for Education failed to plan for a  new schools building programme and local 
authorities  continued to remove surplus places in schools (removing 5 per cent of places between 
2004 and 2010) (HoC, 2013). Furthermore, part of this reduced capital budget has been used to build 
new free schools in areas where  additional capacity is not needed. 
Schools 
Schools current spending has been relatively well protected from budgetary cuts, not least because 
cuts are very difficult to achieve when almost all expenditure  goes on wages. However, teachers 
have been subject to  1 per cent pay rises, well below the rate of inflation, and  changes to their 
pension arrangements from 2015 are  equivalent to a 3 per cent pay cut. 
Against this background of falls in overall education funding, the government has made the first 
moves towards  removing the role of local authorities in the distribution  of school funds through the 
establishment of a national  funding formula. The idea is that eventually each school’s funding will 
be calculated centrally with only  limited discretion for local authorities to vary funding  around 
these levels. However, given the huge variation in funding that currently exists, it is almost 
impossible to  achieve this in an environment of funding freezes (Allen  et al., 2012). So, as a first 
stage, the Department for Education now places restrictions on the items that can  be included in a 
local authority’s own funding formula. The idea is that through the gradual tightening of these 
restrictions, similar schools in different local authorities will see their budgets converge. 
Schools serving more deprived areas have been well protected from funding cuts by the pupil 
premium  policy, which distributes £2.5 billion of the (existing)  education budget to schools at an 
initial rate of £600 per disadvantaged pupil (HMT, 2010). This amount may  seem relatively 
generous, but it is actually a fraction of  the implied additional income (£2,460 for primary 
and  £3,370 for secondary) that schools already received for each pupil eligible for free school meals 
through local  authority formulas (Chowdry et al., 2010). 
The government hoped that this innovation would encourage schools to take on poorer pupils as 
well as to devote resources to raising attainment. There is very little  consensus on how resources 
are best spent to improve  school quality and there is, of course, no way of judging  whether the 
money has been spent effectively or whether  this is a worthwhile exercise.  
One of the strangest announcements of the Parliament  has been the Liberal Democrat claimed 
initiative to  provide free school meals to all infants. It has been very  difficult for many schools to 
implement since many  primary schools have no kitchen. However, the evidence on pilots of this 
policy has been marginally positive  (Kitchen et al., 2012). Whether it is the best way to spend  in the 
education system the headline £1bn of marginal  funds used in the announcement is a point for 
debate. 
Concluding remarks  
In many respects this government has taken a well evidenced and moderate approach to reforming 
the education system against the very difficult backdrop of funding restraints. However, it has often 
done so in a way that is felt to be publicly humiliating for those  involved in delivering education, 
from teachers through  to teacher trainers and local authorities. This is unwise  in a sector where the 
productivity of the workforce is so  tightly bound to their sense of purpose and motivation.  
Libertarian instincts to let market forces improve the  system have been rather overridden by the 
centralising  tendencies of a Secretary of State with an exceptionally  clear vision. Moreover, by 
removing power from  existing devolved institutional structures it has been  passed across to a small 
network of organisations – Ofsted as the sole arbiter of quality, the New Schools  Network which 
helped free schools to open, the Educational Endowment Foundation which reports  on which 
classroom practice is effective and, most importantly, the office of the Secretary of State itself.  This 
leaves open the question of how well a system  can function when those who are given power do 
not  have clear accountability and consequences for their  own mistakes and shortcomings. In this 
new system  without local authorities delivering services, who has  the capacity to intervene to 
manage the system in times  of change and when things go wrong? 
Future governments are unlikely to reverse most reforms but two major issues will have to be 
addressed in the next  parliament. First, how can a decentralised school-based teacher training 
system deliver sufficient numbers of new teachers as the economy recovers? Teacher supply is not a 
problem that can be deferred or ignored, so we may see financial incentives for schools to join 
School Direct or a  partial retreat back to university-led provision. 
Second, who makes sure the schooling system delivers the right quality and quantity of pupil places 
in an entirely  devolved system without local authority control? There  has been, belatedly, 
recognition that a ‘middle tier’ of  oversight is needed and power has been ceded to new Regional 
Schools Commissioners, who will pick new free schools bids and who are judged on the number  of 
schools they persuade to convert to academy status.  However, the regulation is still a mess: local 
authorities have a duty to provide enough places, without the  capacity or control to do so.  
Footnotes 
1. For a fascinating ongoing commentary into the workings of the political team in DfE over 
that period Dominic Cummings provides an enlightening viewpoint at 
http://dominiccummings. wordpress.com/. 
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